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This case—an examination of a real world break-in to a Web server—provides a forensic examination of what happened to 
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the “hack” break-in that is commonplace with Web servers and illustrates the well-known mistakes made in the security 
arrangements by JATF. Select hacking techniques and an overview of network vulnerabilities, as well as discussions about 
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models that business should follow to guard against similar attacks.  Students are encouraged to assess and implement 
solutions using the tools and techniques presented in the case. 
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1. CASE SUMMARY 
 
This case—an examination of a real world break-in to a 
Web server—provides a forensic examination of what 
happened to the Jing An Telescope Factory (JATF). 
Following a discussion of what happened to JATF's 
network, students are presented with common hacks and 
network vulnerabilities, as well as discussions about tools 
and techniques that security professionals use to prevent 
and analyze attacks. 
 
In the classroom and networking lab, students are 
encouraged to explore how JATF's network was 
compromised. They must apply the tools and techniques 
discussed in the case to create a new network diagram that 
incorporates network security design and protocols to 
prevent additional attacks and protect data. This case 
specifically focuses on the “hack” break-in that is 
commonplace with Web servers and illustrates the 
common mistakes made in the security arrangements by 
JATF.  
 
2. ABOUT JATF 
 
The Jing An Telescope Factory (JATF) is a medium-sized 
business located in Ninjing, China. The factory employs 
about 250 people. Out of these 250, about 25 are directly 
responsible for Information Technology (IT) Operations in 
the areas of networking, Web development, database 
management, and other typical IT operations. The network 
security breach discussed in this case occurred during the 
summer of 2002. 
  
In this case, we'll first discuss the existing network 
architecture before the security incident. Then, we'll 
discuss reasons why the incident might have occurred. 
We'll finish with sample consultant recommendations. It 
will be up to you or your team to write a recommendation 
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as well as design new network architectures for increased 
security and data protection that JATF can implement. 
 
3. JATF NETWORK ARCHITECTURE 
 
JATF maintains a large network interlinking intra-building 
departments and inter-building operations systems. A wide 
variety of servers and workstations exist on the network 
and most employees have workstations on their desktops. 
The particular server of interest was running Windows NT 
4.0 (Chinese), and was using the Internet Information 
Server (IIS) to serve Web pages to a private network. 
JATF's network was behind a firewall preventing all access 
from the Internet to the internal networks of the company. 
This included the Main Web Server (MWS) that was 
hacked. The MWS was connected to the primary intranet 
of the company via a Cisco switch. Employees of the 
company had access to the Web server pages via the 
intranet, but not the Internet. 
 
3.1 JATF Network Services 
When the break-in occurred, JATF's MWS was running a 
variety of services, including IIS as a primary Web HTTP 
daemon and FTP. Although other services were in use, 
they played no role in the break-in so are not discussed 
here. 
 
The primary security issue was with the FTPD service. 
FTPD is an application layer daemon supporting the file 
transfer protocol which allows the exchange of files 
between two machines. FTPD is an old service but is still 
widely used. Along with TELNETD it is considered one of 
the more dangerous protocols in use because it can be 
easily misconfigured, can run for anonymous users, and 
sends packets that are unencrypted. At JATF, FTPD was 
run as an anonymous login type service where users could 
login to specific directory structures for uploading and 
downloading files without identifying themselves with a 
login or password. While this is not a safe practice, many 
companies with only internal users opt for this 
configuration. 
 
3.2 JATF Firewall and Logging 
However, JATF's intranet wasn't an open system. To 
protect its intranet from external traffic JATF used a 
standard firewalling approach that involved a CISCO IOS 
based access control list (ACL) to restrict all access to the 
internal networks from the Internet. Thus, a rule such as:  
 
deny ip any any  
 
was used on the inbound interface into the network. This 
rule denies all entrance to the network.  The firewall also 
denied any sort of ICMP (Internet Control Message 
Protocol), SNMP (Simple Network Management 
Protocol), or other packets through the firewall by rule. 
The only rule allowing access from the outside was a TCP 
(Transfer Control Protocol) established rule: 
  
allow tcp any any eq established 
This rule would allow for the return of packets which had 
completed the TCP handshake successfully with an outside 
site. There was a restriction on outbound packets to allow 
only port 80 HTTP connections and HTTPS port 443 
attempts through the firewall outbound. 
 
This is a fairly restrictive set of rules that would not allow 
any access from the outside easily but would not preclude 
internal users from downloading attack products (scripts, 
viruses, etc.) from the Internet. Unfortunately, it was hard 
to track any downloads because the logging system in 
place for the CISCO firewall was not saved but merely 
allowed to stream to a computer screen. When the buffer 
limit was reached, log entries simply were purged 
automatically. Because the level of external activity being 
logged was quite high, the buffer life span was very short 
(roughly 1-2 hours in the daytime and 5-7 hours at night).  
 
3.3 JATF Backup System 
In order to protect its data JATF was using a mirroring 
approach that duplicated the MWS’s hard drive on a 
regular basis. In this case, changes were noted and updates 
made hourly to the backup. This type of system can be 
secure, but must be unidirectional with the main access 
point isolated from the Web access point and other internal 
users. At JATF updates were made on the MWS which 
was also running FTP and a variety of other daemons that 
were not necessarily being used at JATF. In particular, 
TELNETD was also running. 
 
The backup system then copied from the MWS when 
changes were detected with queries at regular intervals. 
There was no firewall between the two systems and access 
was equal on the two machines as they had duplicate 
systems running. The attackers might have attacked the 
backup server but their changes would have then been 
overwritten in the next mirror. 
 
4. SPECULATION ON JATF ATTACK TYPE 
 
4.1 Organizational Situation Influence 
JATF decided to invite various IT constituencies within the 
company to develop their own versions of the Website on 
company time. At least three development teams were 
working on variants of the site that they kept to 
themselves. The prize was being transferred to the 
Webmaster group which constituted promotions and pay 
raises for the programmers. 
 
A system was implemented so that the new developers 
could access resources on a regular basis. JATF did not 
anticipate the possible complications of allowing 
anonymous access to both the backup Web server and 
Internet sites. With anonymous access the possibility of 
sabotage resulting from the intense internal competition 
became a possibility. 
 
4.2 Possible Attack Mechanism 
It's thought that JATF's network breach and resulting data 
loss was the result of a script attack. Script attacks are 
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fairly commonplace as they are quite easy to develop. 
Essentially, the hacker must first compromise the machine 
to obtain a root shell (meta-user) on the machine to be 
compromised  
 
(not all attacks require root privileges but this is a common 
assumption). Script attacks then use various languages to 
process destructive operations very quickly, typically after 
the hacker has departed the scene. 
 
Unfortunately, in some systems, root privileges may be 
obtained without an actual compromise. For instance, a 
typical process may simply be to find a program that has 
root access and “export” the attack script into its path. This 
type of action can often be executed by users with less than 
root privileges on a system, particularly when a directory 
has been given permissions for anonymous use. 
 
Script attacks may be executed by other scripts in this 
fashion where the entire attack is simply loaded into a 
scheduled job and run long after the attacker has left the 
scene. Typically, these types of scripts also include attacks 
on the log files to remove evidence of the attack. 
 
ForeverHack is a fairly obscure (in the West) script attack 
that relies on a simple compromise of the system to allow 
access and then the script virus can be run. This virus, 
developed by a Chinese hacker (foreverhack.net, 2003), 
operates on any files it has access to that have .asp (Active 
Server Pages) extensions. This includes the entire tree of 
many IIS Websites which have been developed using ASP. 
The files are replaced with a single Web page that contains 
the address of the hacker who developed the script. Thus, 
an attack can reduce an entire Web structure to ashes in 
seconds. 
 
At JATF, the attacker most likely used anonymous access 
to FTP into the MWS from some other node on the 
intranet. This access was then used to install the 
foreverhack program (script push) as a part of a larger 
script that attacked the logs. While the system 
administrators could not recall the settings of various 
directories, it was possible using FTP access to change 
directories to areas on the system where a script could be 
run if the attacker created a script, scheduled the script to 
run or ran it manually, and then departed. By the time the 
administrators were able to identify a problem, the damage 
was done and the logs of the attacker were gone. 
 
4.3 Backup Failure 
Compounding the loss of data was JATF's inability to 
recover data. Like many organizations, JATF assumed its 
backup system, in conjunction with the firewall protecting 
it from the Internet, provided adequate means to protect the 
time and personnel hours invested in the competitive site. 
Most of the development data was also stored on JATF's 
mirror/backup server located behind the firewall. JATF's 
backup model discussed earlier is commonly used because 
it is simple to configure but creates a false sense of 
security.  
Many networks use a mirroring mechanism to protect 
production data. Unfortunately, in JATF's case, the backup 
was automated to “mirror” the main Website on a fairly 
rapid turnaround with no built-in archival functionality.  
 
When the MWS was compromised, the backup server was 
also overwritten in a timely fashion. This means that not 
only were the Web files lost, but the logs, which were also 
maintained on this server, were overwritten by the 
attacker’s script. Moreover, the development data was 
erased. At the time of detection of the attack, the 
mirror/backup server was exactly that—an exact copy of 
the compromised machine. 
 
5. COMMON NETWORK ATTACK TYPOLOGIES 
AND TECHNIQUES 
 
Even if we suspect that it was a script attack, we must 
decipher how the hacker placed, planned, and invoked the 
script. Script attacks use various languages to process 
destructive operations very quickly, typically after the 
hacker has departed. Moreover, you must always look at 
the most common types of attacks when investigating a 
network break-in. Below we list the three most common 
attacks and techniques. (Appendix A in the Teaching 
Notes contains additional common hacking techniques.) 
 
5.1 Attack 1: The Ftp Malformed Command Buffer 
Overflow 
Although this is a common hacker technique, this type of 
attack would not likely work in the Windows environment 
as the shell system is not as vulnerable to this type of 
attack as in the Linux/Unix environment. Typically in the 
FTP Malformed Command Buffer Overflow 
(FTPMCBO) attack, the attacker will login anonymously 
and use the FTP command set to attempt to either send 
packets that are of odd sizes for the commands or directly 
manipulate the commands based on the well-known 
protocol to cause a buffer overflow and ultimately achieve 
a root shell. 
 
5.2 Attack 2: The Script Push 
Misconfigured FTP may allow an attacker to push a script 
onto the system under the radar of the firewall/virus scan. 
The script also may be pushed into a directory that has 
been unsecured such as a cron directory in Unix or a 
directory where permissions are improperly set (the FTP 
directory). It is often the case that administrators neglect 
the executable permissions even when controlling other 
reads and writes. If this is so, the script may install a root 
kit, run a program such as foreverhack, install a Trojan, 
delete logs, etc. 
 
5.3 Attack 3: Registry/File Acquisition 
Another well-known Windows NT exploit is to acquire the 
system registry and modify it. It is all too common that 
administrators focus their security to control FTP and other 
access directories but neglect to assume that FTP might be 
used to change directories to unprotected areas. One 
approach is to acquire the registry and attempt to extract 
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system passwords from this area. It is also possible to push 
a modified registry into the Windows system. The former 
is possible even with read only access. The registry could 
be configured to perform a variety of harmful actions. 
 
6. NETWORK SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
 
In all cases the best means to combat network intrusions 
and prevent data loss is to stop it before it happens. To do 
this, you must develop a network security assessment tool. 
In the section that follows, we outline one that will help 
you develop rudimentary security to protect systems from 
obvious risk and hackers with malicious intent. We also 
apply this tool to JATF's original pre-hacked network to 
strengthen its network security. 
 
6.1 Risk vs. Return 
A key element of security must be a decision about risk 
versus return. For example, consider a server welded 
inside a safe and then dropped in the ocean. It’s very 
secure, but not very usable. There's no risk but also no 
return. 
 
A company must decide how much time and effort it can 
spend on security. However, the amount of risk must drive 
this decision. Customer data and mission critical systems 
must be protected. Hackers target high-profile systems and 
information that may be revealed for value or personal 
gain. Low-profile systems are targeted as potential 
platforms for attacks on other systems. Although hackers 
won't want the information on the low-profile system, 
there is still a risk of data being gleaned, destroyed, or 
compromised. 
 
At the very least, a company must focus on securing its 
network. However, if there is greater risk to a system, more 
focus needs to be on that particular system. For that reason, 
a company must rank systems to determine which one is a 
low- versus a high-risk system. 
 
Ultimately, basic security consists of four main elements:  
identification, assessment, observation, and prevention. 




To begin, identify two things: critical points of entry into 
the network and mission critical systems. The most-likely 
entry point is the connection to the Internet. It is also 
important to identify any systems in use that are absolutely 
critical to the business. You must protect these systems and 
identify all possible weaknesses in these machines. For 
instance, a desktop that is used to store your accounting 
system may be considered mission critical, while a system 
used only in the manufacturing shop for printing out orders 
is not. 
 
6.2.1 System Rank Scale: A simple plan is to list all the 
uses of a system and then consider the loss of the system. 
How big will the impact be if the system is compromised 
or erased? Using two ten-point scales you can develop a 
rating of security need for all the systems in your network. 
The first scale is an analysis of the critical level of the 
system. A score of ten (10) represents a system that is 
indispensable (e.g., an e-commerce transactions server) 
and a one (1) represents a system that is connected to the 
network but can easily be replaced/repaired in a failure. 
Reserve the zero score for machines that are not connected 
to the network.  
The second scale is the risk. Machines may represent 
different levels of risk in terms of the amount of access 
they grant. A ten (10) on the scale might be a machine that 
is connected to the Internet, allows anyone to access the 
Web pages, supports FTP transactions, and has remote 
access. A one (1) on this scale is a single user machine that 
allows only inbound transactions (e.g., Web browsing). 
Reserve a zero score for machines that are very low risk 
such as a single user workstation that is password 
protected and not connected to a network. 
 
Obviously, the scale is subjective but it should be useful if 
applied consistently. The scale creates a basic guideline for 
analysis of systems for security. In both scales, the 
operating system (OS) being used should be considered as 
some OSs are weaker than others, particularly dated OS 
legacy systems. 
 
6.2.2 System Rank Applied at JATF: JATF's network 
consists of seven machines located in the factory: a Web 
server, a backup Web server, two administrative 
workstations, and three user workstations. The systems are 
identified by their fourth octet IP addresses as .1, .2, .10, 
.11, .100, .101, and .102, respectively. All of the systems 
are operating under Windows NT (e.g., a legacy system). 
The Web server (.1) is used for providing sales data and 
other information to Web users. The Web server uses FTP 
to support uploading of Website information. The backup 
Web server (.2) maintains a copy of the JATF main 
Website and developmental files. The administrative 
workstations (.10 and .11) have additional network and 
systems privileges. The remaining systems (.100, .101, and 
.102) support only one-way Web transactions and are 
single user, password protected machines.   
 
In this simplified system the first application of the scale is 
to identify the mission critical systems. The obvious is the 
Web server and the backup Web server. These systems are 
the only components that are necessary for the Web 
component to function. The administrative systems for the 
Web operation are not critical. Thus, a quick ranking of the 
systems might look like Table 1. 
 
The ranking implies that only the Web server is very 
important and since it would not devastate the company if 
it failed, the score is not a ten.  
 
In the case of risk identification, the exposure level of the 
machine is to be considered. As all the machines are 
firewalled, only the server is a high risk machine. The 
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Mission Critical Scores 





















These scores indicate which machines are of greatest 
concern and where the security analysis should be focused. 
It may seem obvious where the risks lie in such a small-
scale situation, but formalizing the process will assist you 
in locating which IP addresses should be watched more 
closely, particularly when many machines emerge as risks. 
The administrative systems (.10 and .11) are ranked more 
highly because, even though they are not connected to the 
Internet directly, they have high-level privileges and if they 
are compromised, it could result in serious problems. 
 
6.3 Assessment 
In assessment, you analyze the data gathered and develop a 
risk diagram for the systems in the network. At this point 
you need to both review the scores created earlier and also 
proactively assess the situation, particularly for high-
scoring systems. The first technique is to develop a total 
risk score by adding the mission critical score and the risk 
score together for each machine as shown in Table 3: 
 
Table 3 
Total Risk Score 









6.3.1 Use of NMAP (Network Mapper) for Assessment: 
NMAP (Fyoder, 2003) is a scanning tool that provides a 
serious, professional tool for administrators at no cost. This 
tool is best used on a Unix-based system, such as Linux. 
With the assumption that NMAP has been set up and the 
Linux machine firewalled off from the rest of the system, 
an initial scan can be run. While NMAP provides many 
stealth features for disguising scans, none of these features 
will be covered here as the assumption is the 
administrators are scanning themselves and have no need 
to hide their legitimate activities.  
 
It is also worth noting that NMAP is available with add-
ons, such as NMAPFE, which provide graphical interfaces 
for using NMAP. There also is a Windows version 
available. A simple self-scan from NMAP can be 
performed any number of ways, but a basic scan might 
look like this: 
 
nmap –sT –vv –O localhost (assuming localhost is 
defined as the loopback address of 127.0.0.1) 
 
Figure 1 provides the return of the scan for this basic 
machine. The scan reveals a great deal of information 
about this system. It illustrates two things:  1) what the 
system looks like when a would-be intruder scans the 
system; 2) any unusual or unneeded services that may be 
running. Even though this system is firewalled off, there 
are still ports open that may be attacked from users inside 
the firewall. (Appendix B in the Teaching Notes provides a 
list of well-known ports and what they are typically used 
for.) It's important to know each port's function so that you 
can identify which system services are running at each 
open port. Conversely, you should know when a port 
should not be open. 
 
The most critical information provided by the scan is the 
examination of open ports. In this case, the machine has 
eight open ports that may be running services that are in 
use, or perhaps the administrator has simply failed to 
disable unused services that are set up by default. 
 
6.3.2 Working with the Ports: All of these ports can be 
Trojans or other hacking tools in disguise. NMAP simply 
reports the most common usage of the ports. The fact that 
NMAP says “printer” does not necessarily mean this is 
actually a printer port, it merely means that this is the most 
common usage of port 515. Many Trojans intentionally use 
common ports to avoid detection through misdirection. 
The best rule is to disable any service you are not using. If 
the corporate network administrator feels uncomfortable 
with this approach, the next best approach would be to log 
all activity on the port and see how and if the port is being 
used. 
 
The remainder of the NMAP scan provides some 
information about the operating system. As Figure 1 
illustrates, NMAP is always trying to collect fingerprint 
information to better discern which operating system is 
being run. This is useful only in regard to the failure of 
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NMAP to identify the operating system and the warning 
that IPID (Internet Protocol Identification) scanning is 
possible (this is a subtle form of systems probing for 
information). 
 
Creating a script to automate the scan on a regular basis is 
a very good means of keeping an update on your servers. 
You can create scripts that email you a scan of all your 







your servers are running and a change should be obvious 
without a great deal of scanning of logs. 
 
6.3.3 Ethernet Sniffing: Ethernet sniffing has declined in 
popularity with the rise of switched as opposed to hubbed 
networks. Unlike hubs, which broadcast all packets across 
the network, switches usually filter broadcasts so sniffing 
is only a useful tactic for hackers if they can get close 
access to devices they wish to sniff. 
 
Sniffing can be used to locate weaknesses, particularly 
weaknesses implemented by users on their own systems. 
System administrators can forward packets to a “sniffing 
server” or simply utilize a laptop to sniff any of their 
networks.  
 
The most common problem areas for sniffing are services 
that send packets in the clear. The most notorious of these 
services, Telnet, FTP, SMTP, HTTP, etc., are extremely 
dangerous as anyone on the network can gather packets 
and sort them out to ascertain user names, passwords, 
account information, etc. The packets contain sequence 
numbers to allow them to be sorted out and many 
programs exist that are specifically designed for collection 
of this information (e.g., DSNIFF [Song, 2003]). 
 
You should consider sniffing approaches to assess 
networks for weakness. This is a more time-consuming 
approach than an automated scan. However, it can quickly 
reveal services in use that may result in simple 
compromises by hackers and the use of unauthorized 
services across the network that may result in huge security 
risks. A common risk occurs when end users add a 
service—such as Telnet or FTP— to their workstation for 
their own convenience. Both of these services have known 
exploits. If a hacker can gain root access to a workstation 
by simply sniffing a password from an established 
connection, then there is no need for complex exploits. The 
hacker can simply log in as the legitimate user and 
internally access your network. 
[root@mail root]# nmap -sT -vv -O localhost 
 
Starting nmap V. 2.54BETA22 ( www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) 
Host localhost.localdomain (127.0.0.1) appears to be up ... good. 
Initiating Connect() Scan against localhost.localdomain (127.0.0.1) 
Adding TCP port 25 (state open). 
Adding TCP port 993 (state open). 
Adding TCP port 6000 (state open). 
Adding TCP port 110 (state open). 
Adding TCP port 995 (state open). 
Adding TCP port 22 (state open). 
Adding TCP port 515 (state open). 
Adding TCP port 143 (state open). 
The Connect() Scan took 0 seconds to scan 1542 ports. 
For OSScan assuming that port 22 is open and port 1 is closed and neither are 
firewalled 
Insufficient responses for TCP sequencing (3), OS detection may be less accurate 
For OSScan assuming that port 22 is open and port 1 is closed and neither are 
firewalled 
Insufficient responses for TCP sequencing (3), OS detection may be less accurate 
For OSScan assuming that port 22 is open and port 1 is closed and neither are 
firewalled 
Insufficient responses for TCP sequencing (3), OS detection may be less accurate 
Interesting ports on localhost.localdomain (127.0.0.1): 
(The 1534 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed) 
Port       State       Service 
22/tcp     open        ssh                      
25/tcp     open        smtp                     
110/tcp    open        pop-3                    
143/tcp    open        imap2                    
515/tcp    open        printer                  
993/tcp    open        imaps                    
995/tcp    open        pop3s                    
6000/tcp   open        X11                      
 















Uptime 143.893 days (since Thu Mar  7 10:27:52 2002) 
IPID Sequence Generation: Duplicated ipid (!) 
 
Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 5 seconds  
 
6.4 Observation 
No matter what security you have implemented, you 
should still continually observe your systems. Observation 
is the means of logging the activity of both users and 
potential threats on the system. Logging, like much of 
security, is often neglected for a variety of reasons. The 
most common reason is that logs are often too voluminous 
to effectively review. Software is being developed to help 
interpret and analyze logs, but a tailored log is still the 
most effective method of observation. 
 
6.4.1 Creating Logs: As noted above, logs must be 
tailored to each specific system. Typically, system 
administrators use the default logs in both Windows and 
Unix-based systems. This leads to ignoring the logs and/or 
logs that are too large to be useful. A more advisable 
approach is to create logs against the total risk scores of the 
machine as discussed earlier. First, identify what is 
“normal” for a system. Then create logging scripts that 
focus on atypical activity rather than common use. 
 
It is certainly possible to have a difficult time describing 
what is “normal” and some servers may exceed the bounds 
of definition, but typically a server has only one or two 
functions assigned to it and the activity that may be normal 
is easy to define. Let’s use the example of an email and 
Web server. The email is SMTP and Secure POP-3. The 
Web server operates on port 80. This means that given no 
other needs on the server, all the activity would be on ports 
25, 80, and 993. (See Appendix B in the Teaching Notes 
for additional port information.) One of the first things to 
log is any attempts to connect to other ports. Assuming 
you have a firewall, this should be minimal and any scans 
from internal systems should be a serious warning that the 
system is being examined. It is worth noting that some 
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internal users may scan systems for fun or because they 
read a book like Meinel’s Happy Hacker series (Meinel, 
2003). This type of activity should be barred by policy and 
violations should generate a stern warning. 
 
A second activity to be alert for is failed logins on servers. 
Normally servers should have few system logins (however, 
the admin will have to make this determination). Look for 
multiple attempts on machines where logins are 
uncommon. This is often a prelude to an attack or at least a 
hacker attempting to find a weak password using a 
cracking program such as John the Ripper (Openwall, 
2003). 
 
6.4.2 Securing Logs: Logging also requires a secure 
approach if logs are to be effective. A hacker who has root 
access to your system can easily delete or modify logs to 
remove any evidence of activity. Two basic approaches 
should be considered as a means of logging servers.  
 
Use a logging server behind the firewall to receive log 
information via TCP/IP. If this server allows only 
connections from the machine it is logging and then only 
to receive packets, it will require that the hacker then break 
into the second machine. If the logging server does not 
accept any sort of connections except logging packets by 
some secure means, then this becomes another major 
exploit. 
 
Secondly, an old-fashioned but effective strategy for 
logging is to simply log all the entries to a hard copy 
printer. Unless the hacker can get physical access to the 
printer, it will be impossible to change the logs. This is 
often the task of an outdated printer that has a built-in 
print-server. 
 
6.4.3 Using Logs: Logs need to be usable. In other words, 
they should be to the point and clean. Eliminate all clutter 
and common, legitimate activity. If the log becomes too 
voluminous it will be unusable and ignored. The downside 
to cleaning up logs is the loss of usefulness if attacks occur 
due to missing information. It may be worth considering a 
staged logging where certain events trigger a more 




Observing system activity with customized logs can help 
you determine when a system is under attack or 
functioning outside of established parameters. However, 
preventing attacks before they reach a system is, of course, 
the best security measure. For this, you should rely on 
firewalls as a line of defense. 
 
6.5.1 Firewalling Basics: Basic firewalling should be in 
place for all users connected to a network. Firewalls may 
be either localized system specific firewalls or network-
based point-of-entry type firewalls. The discussion of 
firewalling is generalized to either type of firewall being 
used. It is recommended that all systems maintain some 
type of firewall regardless of the total risk score the system 
earns. 
 
As with the assessment approach above, you must identify 
which services are in use on a given network (for the 
network-level firewall) and the system (for the client-level 
firewall). At the network level it is critical to identify 
common weaknesses that are well known and eliminate the 
ability for external interests to penetrate the firewall. The 
most common attempts are scans of known ports where the 
would-be attacker is looking for IP addresses to attack. 
Attackers will very commonly scan for port 21, 23, 25, and 
80 searching for FTP, Telnet, SMTP, and HTTP servers, 
respectively. As opposed to an open system, it is 
recommended that the firewall block all attempts to 
connect to systems unless that service is being supported 
across the Internet. It is also useful to block all connection 
attempts to non-existent IP addresses as the lack of 
information (e.g., finding a system that is NOT there) is 
also informative. 
 
6.5.2 Standard Approach: The standard approach is to 
block all packets at the firewall and only allow packets 
specifically identified in the firewall. This approach is 
standard in Cisco ACL (access control list) firewalling and 
all Cisco access lists contain an implicit deny as the final 
statement. This has the effect of excluding every 
connection unless a rule is written to allow it. As these 
rules create a choke-point on the network, this is an area 
where methods to prevent denial of service attacks also 
need to be implemented. In other words, a choke-point is a 
location where all packets must clear.  When rule sets 
examine packets on a network, every single packet must be 
processed against the rule set (such as a firewall or IDS).  
As the number of rules in the choke-point grows, the 
processing power needed to process the packets grows as 
well. This is what makes it a likely target for denial of 
service attacks. In the case of small servers and enterprise 
networks, such as JATF's, the threat is much more real as 
low-end hackers often target these less defended networks.     
 
The typical approach is to develop firewall rules that focus 
on rapid connection attempts to multiple ports and then 
either allow the source IP to penetrate the firewall for a 
brief period of time (as these addresses are usually 
spoofed, the attacker receives no return packets) or redirect 
the connection attempts to a “black hole” location which 
filters the packets. For any enterprise that relies on Internet 
connectivity for business purposes, it is critical to take 
some approach to identify DOS and deal with it before the 
attack can crash either the router or the server that the 
attack is directed against. 
 
Firewall rules should allow only packets to specific 
services, not simply an open channel to the IP address. 
While this has the effect of creating additional rules, it 
prevents attackers from examining the system more 
thoroughly. It also eliminates the risk of Trojans being 
placed in the system and then being accessed from outside 
the network. A similar firewall on the local machine will 
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further reduce this risk by controlling internal access as 
well. 
 
6.5.3 Trust Building Approach: A second approach to 
firewalling involves building trust for users. This is not 
possible (at least not easily) for port 80 Web servers and 
other connections that require anonymous access, but it can 
be used to authenticate users from outside the network. 
Trusts may involve either VPN (Virtual Private Network) 
type identification or ticket-based authentication to allow 
access either on a per user basis or a per machine basis. 
Both types of connections create encryption between the 
client and the server as a means of further securing the 
operation. 
Most routers and firewalls support a wide variety of 
methods for authentication. The current trend is toward 
using VPN software to allow users to authenticate their 
connection via a username and password before gaining 
admission to the network. Connectivity may still be 
managed on a user-by-user basis and users should be 
granted no greater access to ports than is needed by their 
job definition.  
 
Kerberos systems (MIT, 2003) create encrypted “tickets” 
or keys on a given machine and then grant that machine 
access. This method is more seamless than the "per user" 
method but creates a greater risk if the machine is being 
shared across many users. Regardless, this approach allows 
users to login from their laptops without having to provide 
their username or other information across the Internet. 
 
The more secure approach is to authenticate each user as 
this requires entry of the information on each different 
connection. This allows for better logging as the user is 
identified and can be managed on a need basis. None of 
these methods protect against social engineering and/or 
theft of a laptop with logins saved. (The Windows OS is 
notorious for this type of security risk since it saves all 
passwords and IDs in the registry if the user so chooses.) 
 
6.6 Secure Backup And Failsafe Approaches 
No matter which firewall configuration you chose to use, 
remember that it's not a complete solution. You must also 
make sure that data is protected in case it's lost or 
compromised. JATF had a firewall installed with Cisco 
ACLs in place and functioning at a basic level. However, a 
crucial flaw was the failure of the backup media to provide 
a reasonable solution to the hack that destroyed the 
systems. Thus, a key component of any security 
assessment is to find a way that is safe and reliable to back 
up the data on the system that is at risk. Let's look at some 
data backup methods on various system types. 
 
6.6.1 End-User Systems: End user computers typically do 
not have servers and services running on them, but must be 
backed up nevertheless to preserve user data. Currently the 
most reliable method for backup is the use of CD-R or CD-
RW technology to “burn” copies of the system at various 
times and store the images in a safe location (e.g., a fire 
safe). It is important to make backups on a regular basis, 
but end users have a great deal of difficulty defining a 
“cycle” or other means to determine when the backups 
should be created. Thus, the recommendation is to back up 
dynamic data at least once a week on a permanent media 
such as CD-R. In a more advanced network setting, a 
scheduled network storage backup can be used to 
automatically save data. However, many organizations do 
not have this functionality in place. 
 
6.6.2 Servers: Obviously servers should be backed up as 
well. The preferred method is to define the server's 
business cycle (such as a business day, week, month, etc.) 
and use that cycle as the starting point for backup 
management. By storing images based on the cycle on CD-
R (or RW) technology, you can maintain images across a 
longer time horizon (a year or two).  This means that a 
business may burn an image of dynamic data on a daily 
basis or whatever cycle it determines to be the key cycle 
for its systems. Typically in an assessment, the cycle 
would be determined by the length of time that could 
quickly be recreated using other means, such as paper 
invoices.  Ideally, the most recent images should be stored 
offsite in order to protect them in the event of fire or other 
natural disaster befalling the location. 
 
6.6.3 Mirror Server Backups: The creation of a true 
support mechanism for your server comes in the form of a 
mirror backup server. Hacks and other types of attacks are 
usually most damaging in the short run. Recovery, 
particularly for enterprise Web business, is critical. At 
JATF, the company had developed a “pull” mirror server 
which on a regular basis duplicated the production Web 
server's image onto itself. This updates the backup server 
with any changes that have been made. The problem is that 
in the compromise of the main Web server, the backup is 
compromised by default with no effort on the part of the 
hacker.  
 
A better solution is a “push” backup. In this approach, the 
production Web server is placed out in the exposed 
position for all to see, but the main source of the server’s 
data is the backup server. This backup server can then be 
rapidly mirrored onto the production Web server as needed 
and the main system images stored only behind the firewall 
on a heavily defended machine that allows no access from 
the Internet. Should a hacker compromise the production 
Web server, the backup image can simply be written 
through a VPN-type connection through the firewall to the 
production Web server. The backup server should never 
accept any connection from the production server except 
for an authenticated backup request. 
 
In this model, main breakpoints in the development cycle 
should also be burned onto permanent storage, such as 
optical disks. All development work should be done on the 
backup, behind the firewall or in a VPN scenario with 
authentication of individual users from outside the firewall. 
This authentication should be handled very carefully and 
logged thoroughly to prevent hackers from using this hole 
in the firewall to attack the backup server. The preference 
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would be to maintain the operation behind the firewall and 
only allow file and system updates internally. Users would 
have to come into the local network to provide updates to 
the backup server.  
 
7. POSSIBLE NETWORK SECURITY 
AND DATA PROTECTION SOLUTIONS 
FOR JATF'S SITUATION 
 
Now that you know the basic security items that you need 
to consider when hardening a network and data from 
hackers, let's look at what the consultant recommended for 
JATF's network. As you look at the solution, take note of 
which concepts and techniques the solution incorporates. 
Also, consider how you might improve the solution. 
Remember, there is definitely more than one way to secure 
a network. 
 
7.1 Replace FTPD 
FTP is an old protocol (RFC 454, 1973). One of the most 
obvious yet overlooked solutions with FTP is to update the 
client (FTPD) to the most current version of FTP (based on 
RFC 959, 1985). However, even this approach does not 
guarantee security using FTPD as a protocol.  
 
As was discussed earlier, one of the easiest approaches for 
a hacker to perform this attack would be to use Ethernet 
packet sniffing to procure a password to the system. As in 
most organizations’ legacy systems, JATF failed to 
consider packet sniffing as an issue in its security. JATF, 
feeling secure in its firewalled environment, created the 
perfect environment for a classic “locked room” crime by 
not monitoring its network traffic. 
 
The first recommendation by the consultant was to 
consider the need for FTP; in particular, the need for 
anonymous FTP as a service. While there are certainly 
anonymous FTP sites in existence, they need to be 
controlled. The consultant could see no reason why the 
company needed to be able to anonymously connect to the 
server to transfer files since only two people were doing 
the transfers and they both had access to the server and 
client doing the transfers. Thus, the first recommendation 
for JATF was to add user accounts for file transfers so that 
logins could be monitored and controlled. 
 
Unfortunately, this in and of itself simply opens the door 
for packet-sniffing-based attacks because FTPD is still a 
notoriously insecure protocol. Thus, the consultant 
recommended migration from FTPD to SFTP (RFC 959, 
1985) as a protocol. This protocol provides an encrypted 
(much like SSH) environment for packet transfer between 
machines while maintaining the traditional FTP 
environment to avoid learning curves and resistance by 
employees. These two simple changes—user accounts 
and SFTP— to the procedure for file transfer at JATF 
might have prevented the entire attack.  
 
 
7.2 Create New Backup Models to Prevent Mirror 
Fault 
The consultant recommended a primary model for the 
development of a reverse mirror. Here the Main Web 
Server (MWS) is protected behind a firewall and the 
Exposed Web Server (EWS) receiving Web connections is 
only a mirror of the MWS as per White, et. al., 2003. This 
model is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Essentially, the MWS is positioned behind a one-way 
firewall that allows only connections to the EWS. In this 
manner, the EWS is mirrored on a regular basis by the 
master copy of this disk being “pushed” through the 
firewall. If the connection between the two is both 
encrypted (VPN) and dedicated (firewall controlled), the 
ability of someone to corrupt data on the MWS is severely 
limited. In the case of JATF, the anonymous connections 
are from the outside network and the MWS should be 












If the model described by White, et. al., 2003 is followed, 
the Working Development Server (WDS) is the only real 
contact point for anyone besides the administrator who 
controls updates between the two servers (Controlled 
Updates). In this manner, the data is heavily protected from 
both external hackers and internal malicious mischief. 
Particular care should be made to limit any access to the 
MWS, and FTP (even SFTP) should be allowed only from 
a trusted IP address (the Controlled Update Administrator). 
All other access should be eliminated. 
 
Furthermore, the MWS (and all other servers) should be 
“hardened” as a means of eliminating unneeded services 
and tools which are not used on that machine (White and 
Rea, 2003). If JATF would follow this network 
architecture, the likelihood of a repeated compromise is 
very unlikely. 
 
Even if attacks can be prevented today, possible new 
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from attacks, system administrators must be able to 
conduct effective system forensics. For this, you must 
consider logging, mirroring, and other issues to learn from 
your mistakes. Hence, the consultant recommended 
various logging techniques. 
 
7.3 Implement Logging Techniques to Preserve 
Evidence 
Logging techniques vary wildly from administrator to 
administrator and platform to platform. One of the key 
problems for JATF was the loss of the logs on the server 
that was compromised. This is a fairly standard tactic by 
most hackers. Typically, a break-in will be accompanied 
by scripts which either “scrub” the log to remove any 
evidence of tampering or identifying marks from the 
hacker, or more commonly, the hacker simply deletes the 
logs from the system. 
 
At JATF the hacker simply deleted the log files on the 
Windows NT server and thus, there was no record of the 
break-in. Likewise, JATF did not log at the router to 
determine internal connections to the Web server, which 
could have provided additional forensic information about 
the system from which the FTP connection originated. 
Granted, it is not difficult to spoof the IP on the attacking 
machine to either an unassigned IP or the IP belonging to 
someone not on the system, but regardless, the need for 
information to determine exactly what happened is critical 
if the problem is to be prevented from reoccurring. 
 
The consultant recommended that JATF should implement 
one (or more) of the following logging mechanisms: 
 
7.3.1 Entry Point Logging: This involves generating 
firewall logs from the point of entry to a network segment. 
This may not be possible if the segments are switched or 
hubbed.  In the event the network is switched or hubbed, it 
is possible to log entry by the addition of firewalling tools 
on each segment, but this may result in great expense and 
maintenance. In the event the system is routed at that 
segment, the router firewall should be used to generate a 
log. 
 
7.3.2 Remote Server Logging: This logging technique is 
very similar to the tactic of Entry Point Logging described 
above. However, now the critical issue is to ensure the 
Web server generates not only an internal log, but also a 
remote log stored on a secure machine. This machine 
should be firewalled from the machines or segments being 
logged and restricted only to log packets being sent from 
the servers. It is important to firewall this machine off as 
the hacker will likely acquire the address of the logging 
server after compromising the machine. Yet, if the remote 
logging server only accepts syslog packets, the likelihood 
of the hacker being able to continue the compromise on 
into the logging server (particularly if it is in a separate 
segment) is very low. 
 
7.3.3 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Logging: This is, 
by far, the most critical type of logging to generate forensic 
information about break-in attempts. Because IDS logging 
is passive, it is very difficult for the hacker to detect it or 
where the logs are being sent. As with the other 
approaches, it is preferable that the IDS send its 
information to a separate storage location that is protected. 
This will require the hacker to perform repeated break-ins 
across multiple firewalls and segments to compromise 
systems. IDS can be performed by a variety of tools on 
most any platform preferred by the administrator. Certainly 
commercial tools are widely used, but it is also common to 
see tools such as Snort (Snort, 2003) and Acid (Snort, 





If JATF had developed logging solutions as per the above, 
a great deal of forensic information about the break-in 
would have been available to the analyst. This would have 
helped determine the source of the break-in, the nature of 
what was done, and possibly the identity of the attacker. 
Logging could also be used to create a strategy that would 
thwart future break-ins. 
 
JATF is not an exception to the rule. Unfortunately, many 
networks are vulnerable to the same type of attacks 
discussed in this case. Administrators and users must 
educate themselves on how to protect networks and data. 
Recovery plans must be put into place to trace activity and 
recover data with minimal loss. Unfortunately, network 
security is usually not a priority until data is lost. This 
mindset must be changed. 
 
9. LEARNING OUTCOMES 
 
In this case, you've seen how one company's network was 
compromised and valuable data destroyed with very little 
effort on the hacker's part. You've learned how the network 
was compromised. You've also been exposed to other 
methods hackers may use to get into a computer network. 
Most importantly, you've learned how to assess and deploy 
a secure network to guard system resources and protect 
data.  
 
Moreover, you've also learned many rules of thumb to 
keep in mind as you plan new networks and audit existing 
architectures: 
 
• Backups are not guaranteed if they are not properly 
protected. 
• An exposed Web server will eventually be comprised. 
• All users should be authenticated to use system 
services. 
• Network security rules and audits should be 
conducted on a regular basis. 
• Hackers will find holes in a network if they exist. 
• Tools for protecting, as well as exposing, 
networks are easily acquired on the Internet. 
• Security should never be taken for granted. 
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